Sugarloaf Chairlift Accident
Emax
30 Dec 2010
"Wondering how much experience the tech on the tower had?"
Me too... Perhaps he was one of the on-site engineers.
Me too... Perhaps he was one of the on-site engineers.
skibum
31 Dec 2010
My understanding is that loaf has a pretty young crew. They expeirianced alot of turnover when Boyne came to town
Dr Frankenstein
06 Jan 2011
Someone on another ski-related forum has said that he didn't see any rope catcher on the sheave train, at least on the pictures. Is that even possible?
(EDIT: Fixed a typo)
This post has been edited by Dr Frankenstein: 31 January 2011 - 08:53 AM
(EDIT: Fixed a typo)
This post has been edited by Dr Frankenstein: 31 January 2011 - 08:53 AM
Lift Dinosaur
06 Jan 2011
Dr Frankenstein, on 06 January 2011 - 09:49 AM, said:
Someone on ski-related another forum has said that he didn't see any rope catcher on the sheave train, at least on the pictures. Is that even possible?
Speculators and Prevaricators....
While I do not have a photo of the exact sheave assembly involved in the derailment, I can tell you that the design did include a rope catcher between the #2 & #3 sheave of the first 4 assembly and one between the #6 & #7 sheave of the second 4 assembly.
Most of the on scene photos I have seen were taken from such distance to make zooming them for detail impossible.
Dino
Nor'eastSkier
26 Jan 2011
Dr Frankenstein, on 06 January 2011 - 09:49 AM, said:
Someone on ski-related another forum has said that he didn't see any rope catcher on the sheave train, at least on the pictures. Is that even possible?
I read an article that said that the cable catcher failed, and that the reason for that failure is still under investigation.
Just in clarification, as Skier highlighted in one of his earlier posts, the main cause for the failure of the lift was determined to be the misalignment of the rope at tower 8. The lift mechanics tried to run the lift at a reduced speed to evacuate the riders of the lift, but unfortunately that reduced speed was enough to derail the lift.
Peter
04 Feb 2011
Chairlift inspection past due
State had granted resort an extension
By John Richardson jrichardson@mainetoday.com
Kennebec Journal
The chairlift that derailed at the Sugarloaf Mountain Resort in late December had just passed a deadline for a comprehensive safety test.
So-called load tests are required for every Maine chairlift at least once every seven years. The last load test on Spillway East was done on Dec. 4, 2003, according to the resort and the Maine Elevator and Tramway Board.
That was seven years and three weeks before the lift's cable came off a 30-foot-tall tower, dropping five chairs to the snow and sending eight skiers to hospitals.
The chief inspector for Maine's Tramway Board had approved the delay, a spokesman said, so Sugarloaf doesn't face any state penalty.
An investigation of the accident continues, so it's not known whether a load test last summer or fall might have uncovered any mechanical problems related to the accident. Wind was quickly identified as a likely factor, but state investigators have since been looking closely at the mechanical components of the 35-year-old lift to figure out why it derailed and why backup equipment failed to catch the cable and keep the chairs from falling.
The fact that the accident occurred after the seven-year testing deadline had passed might become a factor in any liability claims against Sugarloaf and its insurer.
"Their duty is to ensure that lifts are safe for their skiers," said Benjamin Gideon, a Lewiston-based attorney who represents five skiers who were injured in the accident. "There's a reason (experts) chose that seven-year period ... it probably wasn't arbitrary."
Gideon said he had not yet analyzed inspection records or drawn any conclusions about whether Sugarloaf took "reasonable care."
An overdue test does not mean that Sugarloaf was out of compliance with state rules, according to the state. But representatives of other Maine ski areas, and regulators in neighboring states, say they make sure to comply with the seven-year standard.
A spokesman for the state's Tramway Board said the agency effectively granted an extension of the seven-year requirement when the state's chief inspector agreed to a testing schedule set by Sugarloaf that included a load test of Spillway East this year.
"Although tramway owners are responsible for having load tests conducted, the state's inspectors have been in communication with Sugarloaf and the other ski areas regarding this testing. It was understood and approved that a load test would be conducted on Spillway East in 2011," Doug Dunbar said in an e-mail response to questions. "The elevator and tramway program has authority to grant variances to its rules, including extension of the 7-year time frame for load tests."
Chief Inspector John Burpee, who approved Sugarloaf's test schedule, has declined to answer questions about the Tramway Board or the accident at Sugarloaf during the investigation.
Sugarloaf's lift manager was not available to be interviewed, according to Sugarloaf's spokesman.
Ethan Austin, the spokesman, said the test of Spillway East was on a schedule presented to the Tramway Board in 2008. It was one of six chairlifts that would be due for testing by the end of 2010.
"We knew that 2010 was coming up so we got with the Tramway Board to create a schedule," Austin said.
There was no particular reason why Spillway East was scheduled for 2011 instead of 2010, except that the resort wanted to create a sustainable rotation of two or three load tests each year, he said. State officials "were comfortable with that schedule."
The 2003 load test on Spillway East, and the annual inspection done last fall, revealed no significant safety issues, he said.
"I can say the lift was inspected prior to the season and it was properly licensed by the state," Austin said. "Everybody was comfortable operating it at the start of the season and was comfortable with the load test" being done in 2011.
It's too soon to say whether a load test last year might have helped avert December's accident, he said. "We won't know that until the investigation is done and the report is issued."
Load tests are usually done in the off-season, when workers can take the time needed to test the various motors and brake systems, and check the operation of the sheave trains that carry the cable over the towers. It can take a day or more to test a single lift. The tests are overseen by private, state-licensed inspectors who are hired by the resorts or their insurance companies. Reports are made available to the state.
Lift mechanics typically load each chair with a water-filled box until the lift is loaded to capacity, or slightly more than full capacity.
Then they test each motor and brake system, recording operating speeds, stopping distances and other details, such as misaligned sheave trains.
The tests also are required whenever lifts are installed or significantly upgraded. The 2003 load test of Spillway East, for example, was done after a new drive was installed.
States with ski industries began requiring the seven-year load tests in 1999. Maine adopted the requirement in 2003.
Dunbar, the Tramway Board spokesman, said extensions such as the one for Spillway East were not unusual as the Jan. 1, 2010, deadline approached for the first round of tests.
"When reasonable and appropriate plans have been presented, extensions have been granted to New Hermon, Lost Valley, Sugarloaf, Sunday River and Mt. Abram," Dunbar said.
Some extensions have been related to changes in ownership, he said.
Representatives of other Maine ski resorts, while not commenting on Sugarloaf's lift, said they consider the seven-year requirement to be strictly enforced. The rule is a national guideline developed by the National Ski Areas Association and published by the American National Standards Institute in 1999.
"That's cut and dry," said Jim Quimby, operations director at Saddleback Mountain. "They have to be done at least every seven years, and then when there is certain types of work done on a lift," a load test also is required. "You're not going to bypass a critical ANSI standard like a dynamic load test."
All of Saddleback's chairlifts have been tested within the last seven years, he said.
"That's just part of what every ski area does," said Ed Rock, general manager of Shawnee Peak. "We've done all of the prescribed load tests here. I know everybody, at least in this state, takes it very seriously."
"Our load testing is done at a minimum of every seven years," said Darcy Morse, spokeswoman for Sunday River, which is operated by the same company as Sugarloaf, Boyne Resorts.
Morse said Sunday River tested 11 chairlifts last summer and fall to comply with the state deadline.
Dunbar, however, said that Sunday River also was granted an extension, and that at least some of the tests that were done last year should have been done before Jan. 1, 2010.
"Some of Sunday River's load tests ... would have been overdue, if the extension had not been granted," Dunbar said in an e-mail.
Sugarloaf's testing schedule shows that its managers were well aware of the deadline and, for the most part, met it.
Spillway East, as it happens, was an exception. Eleven of Sugarloaf's 13 chairlifts have been load tested in the past seven years.
The only other chairlift at Sugarloaf that has not been tested since 2003 is the West Mountain lift. That lift generally operates only on weekends, and primarily carries skiers from the West Mountain condominiums, said Austin. It is scheduled to be load tested this year.
It is unusual for any chairlift to go beyond seven years without a load test in other northern New England states, according to head inspectors in New Hampshire and Vermont.
"We schedule them out. We don't let them get (behind)," said Robert McLeod, Vermont's passenger and tramway manager. "Those things are really important because you've got stopping distances that have to be met" and other requirements. "It's not a surprise thing (for ski areas); they know it's going to happen."
New Hampshire's tramway board requires a seven-year load test before a chairlift starts up.
"I don't believe, in New Hampshire, we have had any that operated beyond seven years" without the test, said Briggs Lockwood, chief inspector for the Bureau of Tramway and Amusement Ride Safety. "We would require that it be done before it operates again."
Because of the accident in December, Spillway East will get its next load test sooner than scheduled.
A comprehensive load test will be a final step before the mountain is allowed to reopen the lift, according to Dunbar. It could be done as soon as next week, depending on weather and other ongoing tests.
State had granted resort an extension
By John Richardson jrichardson@mainetoday.com
Kennebec Journal
The chairlift that derailed at the Sugarloaf Mountain Resort in late December had just passed a deadline for a comprehensive safety test.
So-called load tests are required for every Maine chairlift at least once every seven years. The last load test on Spillway East was done on Dec. 4, 2003, according to the resort and the Maine Elevator and Tramway Board.
That was seven years and three weeks before the lift's cable came off a 30-foot-tall tower, dropping five chairs to the snow and sending eight skiers to hospitals.
The chief inspector for Maine's Tramway Board had approved the delay, a spokesman said, so Sugarloaf doesn't face any state penalty.
An investigation of the accident continues, so it's not known whether a load test last summer or fall might have uncovered any mechanical problems related to the accident. Wind was quickly identified as a likely factor, but state investigators have since been looking closely at the mechanical components of the 35-year-old lift to figure out why it derailed and why backup equipment failed to catch the cable and keep the chairs from falling.
The fact that the accident occurred after the seven-year testing deadline had passed might become a factor in any liability claims against Sugarloaf and its insurer.
"Their duty is to ensure that lifts are safe for their skiers," said Benjamin Gideon, a Lewiston-based attorney who represents five skiers who were injured in the accident. "There's a reason (experts) chose that seven-year period ... it probably wasn't arbitrary."
Gideon said he had not yet analyzed inspection records or drawn any conclusions about whether Sugarloaf took "reasonable care."
An overdue test does not mean that Sugarloaf was out of compliance with state rules, according to the state. But representatives of other Maine ski areas, and regulators in neighboring states, say they make sure to comply with the seven-year standard.
A spokesman for the state's Tramway Board said the agency effectively granted an extension of the seven-year requirement when the state's chief inspector agreed to a testing schedule set by Sugarloaf that included a load test of Spillway East this year.
"Although tramway owners are responsible for having load tests conducted, the state's inspectors have been in communication with Sugarloaf and the other ski areas regarding this testing. It was understood and approved that a load test would be conducted on Spillway East in 2011," Doug Dunbar said in an e-mail response to questions. "The elevator and tramway program has authority to grant variances to its rules, including extension of the 7-year time frame for load tests."
Chief Inspector John Burpee, who approved Sugarloaf's test schedule, has declined to answer questions about the Tramway Board or the accident at Sugarloaf during the investigation.
Sugarloaf's lift manager was not available to be interviewed, according to Sugarloaf's spokesman.
Ethan Austin, the spokesman, said the test of Spillway East was on a schedule presented to the Tramway Board in 2008. It was one of six chairlifts that would be due for testing by the end of 2010.
"We knew that 2010 was coming up so we got with the Tramway Board to create a schedule," Austin said.
There was no particular reason why Spillway East was scheduled for 2011 instead of 2010, except that the resort wanted to create a sustainable rotation of two or three load tests each year, he said. State officials "were comfortable with that schedule."
The 2003 load test on Spillway East, and the annual inspection done last fall, revealed no significant safety issues, he said.
"I can say the lift was inspected prior to the season and it was properly licensed by the state," Austin said. "Everybody was comfortable operating it at the start of the season and was comfortable with the load test" being done in 2011.
It's too soon to say whether a load test last year might have helped avert December's accident, he said. "We won't know that until the investigation is done and the report is issued."
Load tests are usually done in the off-season, when workers can take the time needed to test the various motors and brake systems, and check the operation of the sheave trains that carry the cable over the towers. It can take a day or more to test a single lift. The tests are overseen by private, state-licensed inspectors who are hired by the resorts or their insurance companies. Reports are made available to the state.
Lift mechanics typically load each chair with a water-filled box until the lift is loaded to capacity, or slightly more than full capacity.
Then they test each motor and brake system, recording operating speeds, stopping distances and other details, such as misaligned sheave trains.
The tests also are required whenever lifts are installed or significantly upgraded. The 2003 load test of Spillway East, for example, was done after a new drive was installed.
States with ski industries began requiring the seven-year load tests in 1999. Maine adopted the requirement in 2003.
Dunbar, the Tramway Board spokesman, said extensions such as the one for Spillway East were not unusual as the Jan. 1, 2010, deadline approached for the first round of tests.
"When reasonable and appropriate plans have been presented, extensions have been granted to New Hermon, Lost Valley, Sugarloaf, Sunday River and Mt. Abram," Dunbar said.
Some extensions have been related to changes in ownership, he said.
Representatives of other Maine ski resorts, while not commenting on Sugarloaf's lift, said they consider the seven-year requirement to be strictly enforced. The rule is a national guideline developed by the National Ski Areas Association and published by the American National Standards Institute in 1999.
"That's cut and dry," said Jim Quimby, operations director at Saddleback Mountain. "They have to be done at least every seven years, and then when there is certain types of work done on a lift," a load test also is required. "You're not going to bypass a critical ANSI standard like a dynamic load test."
All of Saddleback's chairlifts have been tested within the last seven years, he said.
"That's just part of what every ski area does," said Ed Rock, general manager of Shawnee Peak. "We've done all of the prescribed load tests here. I know everybody, at least in this state, takes it very seriously."
"Our load testing is done at a minimum of every seven years," said Darcy Morse, spokeswoman for Sunday River, which is operated by the same company as Sugarloaf, Boyne Resorts.
Morse said Sunday River tested 11 chairlifts last summer and fall to comply with the state deadline.
Dunbar, however, said that Sunday River also was granted an extension, and that at least some of the tests that were done last year should have been done before Jan. 1, 2010.
"Some of Sunday River's load tests ... would have been overdue, if the extension had not been granted," Dunbar said in an e-mail.
Sugarloaf's testing schedule shows that its managers were well aware of the deadline and, for the most part, met it.
Spillway East, as it happens, was an exception. Eleven of Sugarloaf's 13 chairlifts have been load tested in the past seven years.
The only other chairlift at Sugarloaf that has not been tested since 2003 is the West Mountain lift. That lift generally operates only on weekends, and primarily carries skiers from the West Mountain condominiums, said Austin. It is scheduled to be load tested this year.
It is unusual for any chairlift to go beyond seven years without a load test in other northern New England states, according to head inspectors in New Hampshire and Vermont.
"We schedule them out. We don't let them get (behind)," said Robert McLeod, Vermont's passenger and tramway manager. "Those things are really important because you've got stopping distances that have to be met" and other requirements. "It's not a surprise thing (for ski areas); they know it's going to happen."
New Hampshire's tramway board requires a seven-year load test before a chairlift starts up.
"I don't believe, in New Hampshire, we have had any that operated beyond seven years" without the test, said Briggs Lockwood, chief inspector for the Bureau of Tramway and Amusement Ride Safety. "We would require that it be done before it operates again."
Because of the accident in December, Spillway East will get its next load test sooner than scheduled.
A comprehensive load test will be a final step before the mountain is allowed to reopen the lift, according to Dunbar. It could be done as soon as next week, depending on weather and other ongoing tests.
Peter
18 May 2011
According to the Kennebec Journal, the incident report is almost done:
Quote
State inspectors, meanwhile, are still finalizing a long-awaited report on the cause of the Dec. 28 derailment.
A spokesman for the Maine Board of Elevator and Tramway Safety said the agency now expects to release the report by the end of the month.
The agency's chief inspector and a staff inspector "are spending as much time as they can on it while doing their other duties," said Doug Dunbar, spokesman for the Department of Professional and Financial Regulation.
A spokesman for the Maine Board of Elevator and Tramway Safety said the agency now expects to release the report by the end of the month.
The agency's chief inspector and a staff inspector "are spending as much time as they can on it while doing their other duties," said Doug Dunbar, spokesman for the Department of Professional and Financial Regulation.
Peter
08 Jun 2011
They are also here for those who don't have Facebook: http://sugarloaf2020.tumblr.com/
K2Trav
10 Jun 2011
Here is a video i made last summer of the shortening of the Cable on the Superquad
My Link
This post has been edited by K2Trav: 10 June 2011 - 05:40 PM
My Link
This post has been edited by K2Trav: 10 June 2011 - 05:40 PM
slider729
17 Jun 2011
Tramway Board Report released:
No exact reason cited, but like most accidents, a series of problems led to the accident. With all the Mechanical and training deficiencies cited I question the annual inspection process the state performs? Is it different in other states? will this have implications in the industry?
From http://www.maine.gov...st%20Report.pdf
http://www.maine.gov...achment%20A.pdf attachement A
http://www.maine.gov...photo%20log.pdf Photos
TA 31 Spillway East Accident Report
Pursuant to 32MRSA § 15212, the Chief Inspector "may examine or cause to be examined, the cause, circumstances and origin of all tramway accidents in the State". An investigation of a tramway deropement at Sugarloaf Mountain began December 28, 2010. This report outlines the findings of that investigation.
Incident Summary
On December 28, 2010, at approximately 1030 hours, a chairlift located on Sugarloaf Mountain in Carrabassett Valley, Maine, deroped. This deropement occurred at the uphill side of Tower 8 of a chairlift known as Spillway East, or Spillway A. Spillway East has a State of Maine registration number of TA 31. Spillway East was fully loaded at the time of the incident. The winds were gusty and the chairlift had been on "wind hold" earlier in the day. As the deropement occurred, the wire rope that holds the chairlift carriers above the ground immediately plunged toward the ground. This action caused several carriers (chairs) and the occupants (skiers) to strike the snow surface. This accident injured several individuals and 8 individuals sought medical treatment at area hospitals. The deropement did not actuate the brittle bar system so the carriers and wire rope continued to move up the hill until a stop button was actuated utilizing operating controls. Once the lift was stopped, a lift evacuation immediately commenced.
Incident
Sugarloaf Mountain is a ski area located in Carrabassett Valley, Maine operated by Boyne Resorts. On the day of the deropement, the ski area had been dealing with issues resulting from high winds at the area. The lift was not operated from 0830 hours to 0955 hours due to the wind conditions.
At 0955 hours, ski patroller Ben Defroscia and ski lift mechanic Bob Ashe rode the lift for the purpose of evaluating how the lift was reacting to the weather conditions. After riding on the chairlift and assessing the lift's operating condition they made the determination to open the lift to the public.
At 1000 hours the lift was opened and the public was permitted to use Spillway East. At approximately 1015 hours, a ski patroller called in to base operations that the lift was making noise on Tower 8. Two mechanics, Noah Lake (Lake) and Mark Pomeroy (Pomeroy) were dispatched to evaluate the lift. Lake arrived at Tower 8 to assess the situation from the tower and Pomeroy remained at the bottom of Spillway East to control the operation of the lift.
At approximately 1020 hours, Lake climbed Tower 8 to assess the sheave assembly. Once on top, Lake radioed to start the lift so he could evaluate the sheave assembly to investigate what was causing the noise. Pomeroy started the lift and Lake observed that the wire rope was out of the sheave grooves and rubbing on the inside of the outboard sheave flanges. He determined that the sheave assembly on Tower 8 needed to be repositioned to ensure that the wire rope would ride in the grooves of the sheave liners. Lake called for the lift to be stopped so an adjustment could be made. Lake attempted to adjust the sheave assembly position by varying the length of the stiffener.
Lake's initial action was to turn the turnbuckle on the stiffener in the counterclockwise direction. While doing this, Lake noted that the welded joint of the threaded portion closest to the sheave assembly was flexing, and that it was difficult to move the turnbuckle in this direction. Lake placed a "spud wrench" end in the turnbuckle to obtain more leverage. As he was taking this action, Lake determined that the turnbuckle was moving the sheave assembly in the wrong direction to properly adjust position of the sheave assembly. He repositioned the turnbuckle to its original position and then continued clockwise an additional ¼ turn. At this point, Lake radioed Pomeroy to start the lift so he could evaluate whether his actions would cause the wire rope to return to the sheave grooves. As the lift started moving again, Lake realized that he would need to make additional adjustments to get the wire rope back into the sheave grooves and requested that the lift be stopped. At this point, Lake adjusted the turnbuckle, an additional ¼ turn in the clockwise direction. Once this adjustment was completed, the lift was restarted to assess the alignment of the wire rope in the sheave assembly. This adjustment did not correct the wire rope position. The mechanics determined that the lift should be operated on slow to allow passengers to be run off the lift; however, approximately 5 to 10 seconds after restarting the lift to get passengers off, the deropement occurred.
The deropement caused the wire rope and carriers to plunge down towards the ground. Pomeroy pushed a stop button at the loading terminal to shut down the lift. It was reported that the operator at the top terminal also pushed a stop button. We were not able to determine which occurred first.
Investigation Summary
Chief Inspector John Burpee and Deputy Inspector Stan Quinn reviewed the scene of the accident on the afternoon of the occurrence. The assessment was conducted from the ground. The haul rope was visually examined for damage. The haul rope was held off the ground by the chairs on the ground. Five chairs were in contact with the ground. There were drag marks in the snow caused by the carriers. It was estimated that the lift continued to operate (move up the hill) after the deropement for approximately 40 feet before coming to a stop. The sheave assembly was still mounted to the crossarm of Tower 8. The position of the wire rope appeared to be outboard of the sheave assembly but the wire rope may have moved during the evacuation of the lift. The stiffener was broken.
Spillway East is a Borvig chairlift that was installed in 1975. It is a fixed grip double chairlift with 161 carriers. The drive terminal is at the bottom and its primary drive is an electric motor with a gasoline engine for an auxiliary drive. The lift is loaded on the left and turns in a clockwise rotation to move passengers up the hill. The lift has been in operation since installation. The line equipment for the lift is installed on 12 double towers and has a drive and return terminal. The single set of towers serves two lifts, Spillway East and Spillway West. Looking up the slope from the bottom of the lifts, Spillway East was on the left and Spillway West was on the right. Spillway East utilizes Tower 1 through Tower 12. The two lifts share towers up to and including Tower 9. Spillway West is shorter and was installed a few years after Spillway East.
Spillway East has a counterweight block of concrete installed to maintain tension on the lift line during various operating conditions. The bottom drive terminal moves forward and aft on rollers along a rail system installed to accommodate this type of movement.
Interviews were conducted with personnel involved with the operation of the lift on the day of the incident as well as those responsible for maintenance of the lift. Lift operations and maintenance personnel indicated there were no unusual occurrences with the lift prior to the report of the metallic noise at Tower 8 at approximately 1015 hours.
During a records review, we evaluated operational logs, the maintenance manual and records of prior maintenance activities related to the lift.
The maintenance records were inadequate. The area did not have a complete maintenance manual or all the drawings for Spillway East. Some Borvig manuals require the removal and evaluation of sheave assemblies every four years, we are not certain that these documents apply to this lift. The sheave assemblies on this lift were not removed every four years. Some maintenance had been performed and recorded but, in general, maintenance procedures were not specific. Since the maintenance manual was not available there was no way to verify all maintenance items had been completed. Not all maintenance activities were recorded in the maintenance log.
The lift mechanics do not receive training in a structured or formalized manner. The mechanics receive training informally which is provided by ski area personnel but this training was not documented. This training is usually accomplished via a mentoring method. The senior mechanics would have a junior mechanic as a helper while the senior mechanic performed maintenance. Once the senior mechanic determined the junior mechanic was capable of completing the maintenance activities then the junior mechanic completed maintenance tasks alone.
We heard different opinions from mechanics on how to perform tasks, so the training was not consistent. Of particular interest was the method of adjusting the alignment of the sheave assemblies that have stiffeners installed. Some mechanics adjusted the length of the stiffener to move the sheave assemblies so the rope is in alignment with the sheave grooves. After talking to senior maintenance personnel who are no longer employed by the ski area but with significant experience with the intended use of the stiffener, it was determined that the stiffeners were only to be used to hold the sheave assemblies in position once alignment was correct. The intended use of the stiffeners was to reduce any misalignment caused by wind. The stiffeners were not intended to be used as an adjustment device.
Equipment checks evaluated the lift components in an attempt to determine the cause of the deropement and determine the suitability of returning the lift to operation. This review of lift systems revealed some issues that needed to be corrected prior to returning the lift to service. Additionally, criteria were developed by a professional engineer, Boyne personnel and Sugarloaf maintenance staff to determine suitability of sheave assemblies for repair or replacement. Line equipment was evaluated using this criteria and corrective action was taken to ensure proper conditions were met prior to the load test. The stiffener and its use were reviewed by a professional engineer. The entire review and repair efforts were overseen by a professional engineer.
The counterweight system permits the drive carriage to move forward and aft so as to maintain proper line tension and adjust for load changes. The drive carriage moves on wheels and steel rails to maintain tension on the lift line. The steel rails, which appear to be part of the original installation, had channels worn into them where the carriage wheels move. These channels were as wide as the carriage wheels and had enough depth to permit the buildup of ice or snow. These channels in the rails were repaired by covering them with plate steel welded to the rail support to provide for a smooth surface for the carriage wheels to move on.
The drive carriage moves on four carriage wheel assemblies. These assemblies are located in the four corners of the carriage and permit movement. Each carriage wheel assembly has a pin and bearing set attached to the wheel. When the carriage wheel assemblies were taken apart, we noted that the loaded surfaces of the pins were worn on three of the four wheel assemblies. The pin and roller bearing sets on these wheel assemblies were replaced. The fourth wheel assembly located on the back left side of the carriage was not replaced. This wheel assembly has a sleeve bearing instead of a roller bearing. This sleeve bearing was made of a bronze type material. It is not known why the bearings were different in this fourth carriage wheel assembly. The condition of the three carriage wheel assemblies prior to being repaired would not have allowed them to move as freely as intended thereby hindering carriage movement.
The counterweight sheave system was evaluated to ensure adequate movement of the sheaves to permit proper range of movement of the counterweight. No adverse conditions were noted.
We noticed the bullwheel was wearing a notch in one of the support beams in the carriage structure. The bullwheel upper flange was not true, so as it rotated, the bullwheel was coming into contact with the structural support. The bullwheel brake was adjusted to ensure that the bullwheel brake did not apply too much upward force on the bullwheel upper flange; this adjustment prevented the bullwheel upper flange from coming into contact with the support structure during actuation. The support structure was repaired by welding additional plate steel to it. Once completed, this repair allowed for continued use.
The installed sheave assemblies and line equipment for the lift were re-evaluated to criteria established after the accident to ensure the existing components were suitable for continued operation. A specific maintenance record was developed to document the noted conditions as the sheave assemblies and components were evaluated. These maintenance records are at the area. Corrective actions were taken to address noted deficiencies. Some sheave assemblies were replaced with new sheave assemblies. Many sheave assemblies were removed from the towers and repaired in the shop. Once a sheave assembly was down off the towers, area personnel used the opportunity to change out many of the components, regardless of condition. The pins were replaced as needed and any looseness or play was corrected by the installation of new pins and/or welding to correct for any oblong or egged out holes noted on the sheave walking beams. These repairs included, but were not limited to, the repair of sheave walking beams, and the replacement of sheave walking beam pins, sheave liners, sheave flanges and bolts. All pivot points and bolts were verified for tightness and movement prior to returning each sheave assembly to the towers.
A line survey was conducted by Sawyer Engineering to verify the alignment of Tower 8. The tower was not significantly out of alignment; however, as a result of the survey, the mounting bracket for the sheave assembly located on Tower 8 was moved out (to the outside) approximately 3 inches total. The survey was done while there was no load on the lift line and while there was no load on Spillway West.
The tower bolts were checked for tightness on Towers 6, 7 and 8.
we noted no issues with the electric drive, auxiliary engine or gear box.
The sheave assembly installed on Tower 8 was removed from the tower and taken down to the maintenance garage to be evaluated in detail to assist in determining the cause of the deropement.
The evaluation of the sheave assembly revealed the following:
The sheave assembly was free to move as intended. The main beam was able to rotate up and down in the plane of the wire rope as permitted by the main beam pin. The articulating joint permits the sheave assembly below this joint to rotate side to side in relation to the plane of the wire rope. The main hanger joint permits the entire sheave assembly to rotate forward and aft with the direction of the wire rope. The sheave assembly had two 4-sheave assemblies. Each of the 4-sheave assemblies was able to move up and down, as intended, on its pin. The incoming 4-sheave assembly had loose bolts and allowed side to side movement relative to the plane of the rope. The outgoing 4-sheave assembly was tightly attached by its bolts and did not permit side to side movement relative to the plane of the rope. The sheave assembly had four 2-sheave pairing beams. Each of the four 2-sheave pairing beams was free to move in an "up and down" movement, as intended, on its pin. No looseness was observed in the bearings or pivot pins. Each of the eight sheaves rotated freely. The sheave liners seemed in acceptable condition although some minor degradation of the liners was noted. Many of the sheaves had relatively new bolting material which secures the liner in between the sheave flanges.
Proper alignment of the sheave assembly could not have been maintained if the incoming sheave assembly was loose while installed on the tower.
The 4-sheave assembly is connected to the main walking beam by two bolts through a bracket. The bracket on the incoming 4-sheave assembly beam has two different types of bolt holes. The bolt hole on the incoming side of the bracket is round and the bolt hole on the outgoing side is elongated. This elongated hole allows for side to side adjustment to assist with aligning the sheave assembly with the wire rope. Shims were installed between the main walking beam and the 4-sheave assembly bracket. At this attachment point, the metal of the main walking beam was bowed up approximately 1/8 inch. The bolt installed in the elongated hole of the incoming sheave assembly bracket had been replaced and the bolt was different than the others that were installed. This bolt had a washer installed between the bolt head and the bracket. When the bolt and washers were removed, this washer was found to be deformed (dished and beveled).
Although the stiffener's effect on the sheave assembly was not taken into account during the evaluation of the sheave assembly described above, it is important to the review of the accident. The stiffener in this case is a mechanical device that acts as a brace and is rigidly affixed to the hanging arm of the sheave assembly and the bottom of the tower cross arm. This device was made out of what appears to be a turnbuckle, threaded rod, steel brackets, and plate steel welded together to form a single component whose length could be adjusted by turning the turnbuckle portion of the stiffener. On this particular stiffener, as installed, if the turnbuckle is moved clockwise, the length of the stiffener to shortened. Movement in the opposite direction causes the length of the stiffener to increase. The stiffener was broken in two pieces; it failed at the welded joint where a threaded portion attached to a bracket that was clamped on the arm of the sheave assembly. A report regarding the broken stiffener is provided in appendix A.
The sheave assembly has many outside sheave flanges that have little or no metal extending above the surface of the liner.
Sheave number 5 had a different style flange from the other sheaves.
Sheave number 6 was shiny on the inside face of the outside flange indicating that the wire rope was recently rubbing along it.
The sheave flanges were modified to reduce the height of the outside flange. Some of the flanges were impacted by grips at some point in the operation of the lift but no bright metal was noted to indicate recent grip contact.
The sheave assembly was slammed into the mounting bracket and cross arm of the tower during the deropement.
The cable catcher on the outgoing 4-sheave assembly was impacted by the rope as it slipped off the sheaves.
The cable catcher on the incoming 4-sheave assembly was not impacted by the wire rope as it slipped off the sheaves. The brittle bar was intact on the incoming sheave assembly.
Summary
Although we were not able to determine the exact cause of the December 28, 2010 deropement, interactions involving mechanical components, the environment and human factors all are believed to have contributed. Some of the primary factors that could have contributed to the deropement are listed below. This list is not comprehensive. Additional factors occurring at the time of the accident remain unknown, such as actual wind speed, actual load on the line, load and effect of the other lift on the tower.
Environmental:
Wind conditions caused the carriers to swing on the line
Systemic:
Lack of formal training program
Procedures for evaluating the conditions which authorize the lift to operate are subjective.
Lift maintenance training program did not provide for consistent results
• The maintenance program as practiced did not adequately address the issues with the lift
Components:
The carriage was not able to move freely due to the deformation of the rails and worn pin and roller bearings in the wheel assemblies.
The counterweight was in contact with the wall in the counterweight pit.
Tower 8 sheave assembly:
• did not maintain proper alignment.
• any self adjustment of assembly was restricted by the stiffener.
• all components were not tight.
• sheaves in some cases did not have outside flanges that extended high enough above the liner.
Stiffener was used to adjust the alignment of the sheave assembly.
This post has been edited by slider729: 17 June 2011 - 07:08 PM
No exact reason cited, but like most accidents, a series of problems led to the accident. With all the Mechanical and training deficiencies cited I question the annual inspection process the state performs? Is it different in other states? will this have implications in the industry?
From http://www.maine.gov...st%20Report.pdf
http://www.maine.gov...achment%20A.pdf attachement A
http://www.maine.gov...photo%20log.pdf Photos
TA 31 Spillway East Accident Report
Pursuant to 32MRSA § 15212, the Chief Inspector "may examine or cause to be examined, the cause, circumstances and origin of all tramway accidents in the State". An investigation of a tramway deropement at Sugarloaf Mountain began December 28, 2010. This report outlines the findings of that investigation.
Incident Summary
On December 28, 2010, at approximately 1030 hours, a chairlift located on Sugarloaf Mountain in Carrabassett Valley, Maine, deroped. This deropement occurred at the uphill side of Tower 8 of a chairlift known as Spillway East, or Spillway A. Spillway East has a State of Maine registration number of TA 31. Spillway East was fully loaded at the time of the incident. The winds were gusty and the chairlift had been on "wind hold" earlier in the day. As the deropement occurred, the wire rope that holds the chairlift carriers above the ground immediately plunged toward the ground. This action caused several carriers (chairs) and the occupants (skiers) to strike the snow surface. This accident injured several individuals and 8 individuals sought medical treatment at area hospitals. The deropement did not actuate the brittle bar system so the carriers and wire rope continued to move up the hill until a stop button was actuated utilizing operating controls. Once the lift was stopped, a lift evacuation immediately commenced.
Incident
Sugarloaf Mountain is a ski area located in Carrabassett Valley, Maine operated by Boyne Resorts. On the day of the deropement, the ski area had been dealing with issues resulting from high winds at the area. The lift was not operated from 0830 hours to 0955 hours due to the wind conditions.
At 0955 hours, ski patroller Ben Defroscia and ski lift mechanic Bob Ashe rode the lift for the purpose of evaluating how the lift was reacting to the weather conditions. After riding on the chairlift and assessing the lift's operating condition they made the determination to open the lift to the public.
At 1000 hours the lift was opened and the public was permitted to use Spillway East. At approximately 1015 hours, a ski patroller called in to base operations that the lift was making noise on Tower 8. Two mechanics, Noah Lake (Lake) and Mark Pomeroy (Pomeroy) were dispatched to evaluate the lift. Lake arrived at Tower 8 to assess the situation from the tower and Pomeroy remained at the bottom of Spillway East to control the operation of the lift.
At approximately 1020 hours, Lake climbed Tower 8 to assess the sheave assembly. Once on top, Lake radioed to start the lift so he could evaluate the sheave assembly to investigate what was causing the noise. Pomeroy started the lift and Lake observed that the wire rope was out of the sheave grooves and rubbing on the inside of the outboard sheave flanges. He determined that the sheave assembly on Tower 8 needed to be repositioned to ensure that the wire rope would ride in the grooves of the sheave liners. Lake called for the lift to be stopped so an adjustment could be made. Lake attempted to adjust the sheave assembly position by varying the length of the stiffener.
Lake's initial action was to turn the turnbuckle on the stiffener in the counterclockwise direction. While doing this, Lake noted that the welded joint of the threaded portion closest to the sheave assembly was flexing, and that it was difficult to move the turnbuckle in this direction. Lake placed a "spud wrench" end in the turnbuckle to obtain more leverage. As he was taking this action, Lake determined that the turnbuckle was moving the sheave assembly in the wrong direction to properly adjust position of the sheave assembly. He repositioned the turnbuckle to its original position and then continued clockwise an additional ¼ turn. At this point, Lake radioed Pomeroy to start the lift so he could evaluate whether his actions would cause the wire rope to return to the sheave grooves. As the lift started moving again, Lake realized that he would need to make additional adjustments to get the wire rope back into the sheave grooves and requested that the lift be stopped. At this point, Lake adjusted the turnbuckle, an additional ¼ turn in the clockwise direction. Once this adjustment was completed, the lift was restarted to assess the alignment of the wire rope in the sheave assembly. This adjustment did not correct the wire rope position. The mechanics determined that the lift should be operated on slow to allow passengers to be run off the lift; however, approximately 5 to 10 seconds after restarting the lift to get passengers off, the deropement occurred.
The deropement caused the wire rope and carriers to plunge down towards the ground. Pomeroy pushed a stop button at the loading terminal to shut down the lift. It was reported that the operator at the top terminal also pushed a stop button. We were not able to determine which occurred first.
Investigation Summary
Chief Inspector John Burpee and Deputy Inspector Stan Quinn reviewed the scene of the accident on the afternoon of the occurrence. The assessment was conducted from the ground. The haul rope was visually examined for damage. The haul rope was held off the ground by the chairs on the ground. Five chairs were in contact with the ground. There were drag marks in the snow caused by the carriers. It was estimated that the lift continued to operate (move up the hill) after the deropement for approximately 40 feet before coming to a stop. The sheave assembly was still mounted to the crossarm of Tower 8. The position of the wire rope appeared to be outboard of the sheave assembly but the wire rope may have moved during the evacuation of the lift. The stiffener was broken.
Spillway East is a Borvig chairlift that was installed in 1975. It is a fixed grip double chairlift with 161 carriers. The drive terminal is at the bottom and its primary drive is an electric motor with a gasoline engine for an auxiliary drive. The lift is loaded on the left and turns in a clockwise rotation to move passengers up the hill. The lift has been in operation since installation. The line equipment for the lift is installed on 12 double towers and has a drive and return terminal. The single set of towers serves two lifts, Spillway East and Spillway West. Looking up the slope from the bottom of the lifts, Spillway East was on the left and Spillway West was on the right. Spillway East utilizes Tower 1 through Tower 12. The two lifts share towers up to and including Tower 9. Spillway West is shorter and was installed a few years after Spillway East.
Spillway East has a counterweight block of concrete installed to maintain tension on the lift line during various operating conditions. The bottom drive terminal moves forward and aft on rollers along a rail system installed to accommodate this type of movement.
Interviews were conducted with personnel involved with the operation of the lift on the day of the incident as well as those responsible for maintenance of the lift. Lift operations and maintenance personnel indicated there were no unusual occurrences with the lift prior to the report of the metallic noise at Tower 8 at approximately 1015 hours.
During a records review, we evaluated operational logs, the maintenance manual and records of prior maintenance activities related to the lift.
The maintenance records were inadequate. The area did not have a complete maintenance manual or all the drawings for Spillway East. Some Borvig manuals require the removal and evaluation of sheave assemblies every four years, we are not certain that these documents apply to this lift. The sheave assemblies on this lift were not removed every four years. Some maintenance had been performed and recorded but, in general, maintenance procedures were not specific. Since the maintenance manual was not available there was no way to verify all maintenance items had been completed. Not all maintenance activities were recorded in the maintenance log.
The lift mechanics do not receive training in a structured or formalized manner. The mechanics receive training informally which is provided by ski area personnel but this training was not documented. This training is usually accomplished via a mentoring method. The senior mechanics would have a junior mechanic as a helper while the senior mechanic performed maintenance. Once the senior mechanic determined the junior mechanic was capable of completing the maintenance activities then the junior mechanic completed maintenance tasks alone.
We heard different opinions from mechanics on how to perform tasks, so the training was not consistent. Of particular interest was the method of adjusting the alignment of the sheave assemblies that have stiffeners installed. Some mechanics adjusted the length of the stiffener to move the sheave assemblies so the rope is in alignment with the sheave grooves. After talking to senior maintenance personnel who are no longer employed by the ski area but with significant experience with the intended use of the stiffener, it was determined that the stiffeners were only to be used to hold the sheave assemblies in position once alignment was correct. The intended use of the stiffeners was to reduce any misalignment caused by wind. The stiffeners were not intended to be used as an adjustment device.
Equipment checks evaluated the lift components in an attempt to determine the cause of the deropement and determine the suitability of returning the lift to operation. This review of lift systems revealed some issues that needed to be corrected prior to returning the lift to service. Additionally, criteria were developed by a professional engineer, Boyne personnel and Sugarloaf maintenance staff to determine suitability of sheave assemblies for repair or replacement. Line equipment was evaluated using this criteria and corrective action was taken to ensure proper conditions were met prior to the load test. The stiffener and its use were reviewed by a professional engineer. The entire review and repair efforts were overseen by a professional engineer.
The counterweight system permits the drive carriage to move forward and aft so as to maintain proper line tension and adjust for load changes. The drive carriage moves on wheels and steel rails to maintain tension on the lift line. The steel rails, which appear to be part of the original installation, had channels worn into them where the carriage wheels move. These channels were as wide as the carriage wheels and had enough depth to permit the buildup of ice or snow. These channels in the rails were repaired by covering them with plate steel welded to the rail support to provide for a smooth surface for the carriage wheels to move on.
The drive carriage moves on four carriage wheel assemblies. These assemblies are located in the four corners of the carriage and permit movement. Each carriage wheel assembly has a pin and bearing set attached to the wheel. When the carriage wheel assemblies were taken apart, we noted that the loaded surfaces of the pins were worn on three of the four wheel assemblies. The pin and roller bearing sets on these wheel assemblies were replaced. The fourth wheel assembly located on the back left side of the carriage was not replaced. This wheel assembly has a sleeve bearing instead of a roller bearing. This sleeve bearing was made of a bronze type material. It is not known why the bearings were different in this fourth carriage wheel assembly. The condition of the three carriage wheel assemblies prior to being repaired would not have allowed them to move as freely as intended thereby hindering carriage movement.
The counterweight sheave system was evaluated to ensure adequate movement of the sheaves to permit proper range of movement of the counterweight. No adverse conditions were noted.
We noticed the bullwheel was wearing a notch in one of the support beams in the carriage structure. The bullwheel upper flange was not true, so as it rotated, the bullwheel was coming into contact with the structural support. The bullwheel brake was adjusted to ensure that the bullwheel brake did not apply too much upward force on the bullwheel upper flange; this adjustment prevented the bullwheel upper flange from coming into contact with the support structure during actuation. The support structure was repaired by welding additional plate steel to it. Once completed, this repair allowed for continued use.
The installed sheave assemblies and line equipment for the lift were re-evaluated to criteria established after the accident to ensure the existing components were suitable for continued operation. A specific maintenance record was developed to document the noted conditions as the sheave assemblies and components were evaluated. These maintenance records are at the area. Corrective actions were taken to address noted deficiencies. Some sheave assemblies were replaced with new sheave assemblies. Many sheave assemblies were removed from the towers and repaired in the shop. Once a sheave assembly was down off the towers, area personnel used the opportunity to change out many of the components, regardless of condition. The pins were replaced as needed and any looseness or play was corrected by the installation of new pins and/or welding to correct for any oblong or egged out holes noted on the sheave walking beams. These repairs included, but were not limited to, the repair of sheave walking beams, and the replacement of sheave walking beam pins, sheave liners, sheave flanges and bolts. All pivot points and bolts were verified for tightness and movement prior to returning each sheave assembly to the towers.
A line survey was conducted by Sawyer Engineering to verify the alignment of Tower 8. The tower was not significantly out of alignment; however, as a result of the survey, the mounting bracket for the sheave assembly located on Tower 8 was moved out (to the outside) approximately 3 inches total. The survey was done while there was no load on the lift line and while there was no load on Spillway West.
The tower bolts were checked for tightness on Towers 6, 7 and 8.
we noted no issues with the electric drive, auxiliary engine or gear box.
The sheave assembly installed on Tower 8 was removed from the tower and taken down to the maintenance garage to be evaluated in detail to assist in determining the cause of the deropement.
The evaluation of the sheave assembly revealed the following:
The sheave assembly was free to move as intended. The main beam was able to rotate up and down in the plane of the wire rope as permitted by the main beam pin. The articulating joint permits the sheave assembly below this joint to rotate side to side in relation to the plane of the wire rope. The main hanger joint permits the entire sheave assembly to rotate forward and aft with the direction of the wire rope. The sheave assembly had two 4-sheave assemblies. Each of the 4-sheave assemblies was able to move up and down, as intended, on its pin. The incoming 4-sheave assembly had loose bolts and allowed side to side movement relative to the plane of the rope. The outgoing 4-sheave assembly was tightly attached by its bolts and did not permit side to side movement relative to the plane of the rope. The sheave assembly had four 2-sheave pairing beams. Each of the four 2-sheave pairing beams was free to move in an "up and down" movement, as intended, on its pin. No looseness was observed in the bearings or pivot pins. Each of the eight sheaves rotated freely. The sheave liners seemed in acceptable condition although some minor degradation of the liners was noted. Many of the sheaves had relatively new bolting material which secures the liner in between the sheave flanges.
Proper alignment of the sheave assembly could not have been maintained if the incoming sheave assembly was loose while installed on the tower.
The 4-sheave assembly is connected to the main walking beam by two bolts through a bracket. The bracket on the incoming 4-sheave assembly beam has two different types of bolt holes. The bolt hole on the incoming side of the bracket is round and the bolt hole on the outgoing side is elongated. This elongated hole allows for side to side adjustment to assist with aligning the sheave assembly with the wire rope. Shims were installed between the main walking beam and the 4-sheave assembly bracket. At this attachment point, the metal of the main walking beam was bowed up approximately 1/8 inch. The bolt installed in the elongated hole of the incoming sheave assembly bracket had been replaced and the bolt was different than the others that were installed. This bolt had a washer installed between the bolt head and the bracket. When the bolt and washers were removed, this washer was found to be deformed (dished and beveled).
Although the stiffener's effect on the sheave assembly was not taken into account during the evaluation of the sheave assembly described above, it is important to the review of the accident. The stiffener in this case is a mechanical device that acts as a brace and is rigidly affixed to the hanging arm of the sheave assembly and the bottom of the tower cross arm. This device was made out of what appears to be a turnbuckle, threaded rod, steel brackets, and plate steel welded together to form a single component whose length could be adjusted by turning the turnbuckle portion of the stiffener. On this particular stiffener, as installed, if the turnbuckle is moved clockwise, the length of the stiffener to shortened. Movement in the opposite direction causes the length of the stiffener to increase. The stiffener was broken in two pieces; it failed at the welded joint where a threaded portion attached to a bracket that was clamped on the arm of the sheave assembly. A report regarding the broken stiffener is provided in appendix A.
The sheave assembly has many outside sheave flanges that have little or no metal extending above the surface of the liner.
Sheave number 5 had a different style flange from the other sheaves.
Sheave number 6 was shiny on the inside face of the outside flange indicating that the wire rope was recently rubbing along it.
The sheave flanges were modified to reduce the height of the outside flange. Some of the flanges were impacted by grips at some point in the operation of the lift but no bright metal was noted to indicate recent grip contact.
The sheave assembly was slammed into the mounting bracket and cross arm of the tower during the deropement.
The cable catcher on the outgoing 4-sheave assembly was impacted by the rope as it slipped off the sheaves.
The cable catcher on the incoming 4-sheave assembly was not impacted by the wire rope as it slipped off the sheaves. The brittle bar was intact on the incoming sheave assembly.
Summary
Although we were not able to determine the exact cause of the December 28, 2010 deropement, interactions involving mechanical components, the environment and human factors all are believed to have contributed. Some of the primary factors that could have contributed to the deropement are listed below. This list is not comprehensive. Additional factors occurring at the time of the accident remain unknown, such as actual wind speed, actual load on the line, load and effect of the other lift on the tower.
Environmental:
Wind conditions caused the carriers to swing on the line
Systemic:
Lack of formal training program
Procedures for evaluating the conditions which authorize the lift to operate are subjective.
Lift maintenance training program did not provide for consistent results
• The maintenance program as practiced did not adequately address the issues with the lift
Components:
The carriage was not able to move freely due to the deformation of the rails and worn pin and roller bearings in the wheel assemblies.
The counterweight was in contact with the wall in the counterweight pit.
Tower 8 sheave assembly:
• did not maintain proper alignment.
• any self adjustment of assembly was restricted by the stiffener.
• all components were not tight.
• sheaves in some cases did not have outside flanges that extended high enough above the liner.
Stiffener was used to adjust the alignment of the sheave assembly.
This post has been edited by slider729: 17 June 2011 - 07:08 PM
Skiing#1
08 Dec 2011
Sugarloaf installed a new chairlift
youtube video. Chairlift looks nice.
http://www.youtube.c...h?v=VhOEEFiUhWI
youtube video. Chairlift looks nice.
http://www.youtube.c...h?v=VhOEEFiUhWI
Andy1962
24 Jun 2015
happened to find this settlement notice online for a couple of the injured parties in this lift incident.
http://www.nytimes.c...ml?ref=yfp&_r=0
source New York Times: Associated Press June 22, 2015
http://www.nytimes.c...ml?ref=yfp&_r=0
source New York Times: Associated Press June 22, 2015
CARRABASSETT VALLEY, Maine — A Delaware couple has reached an out-of-court settlement with Maine's Sugarloaf ski resort over a 2010 chairlift malfunction that sent them and their two daughters plunging about 30 feet. Terms haven't been disclosed.
A Sugarloaf spokesman say the settlement with Michael and Patricia Katz of Wilmington, Delaware, brings an end to litigation stemming from the December 2010 accident. The lawsuit contended the father suffered a traumatic brain injury and that both girls suffered closed-head injuries.
The Sun Journal first reported the settlement Monday.
The family was riding on the East Spillway lift when a cable jumped its track, causing five chairs to plummet. That chairlift was removed and replaced with a new one. Seven people were hurt in another incident last March when a different lift began moving backward.
